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NOTES
-PURPOSE AND PERTINENCY IN CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS
An old fable tells of six blind men and an elephant. The first
to come upon it touched a leg, and to him the elephant resembled nothing so much as a tree. The second blind man.
encountering the tail, concluded that the elephant was like
a rope. The third, whose groping hand had found the trunk,
was convinced that the beast was much the same as a huge
snake. To the others the elephant was like a wall, a great leaf
and a sharp spear. Modern "blind men" are still examining
and describing "elephants" 1
Although mindful of the above admonition, this Note deals with
but two facets of congressional investigations (1) the judicial
limitation that the investigation be for a legislative purpose, and,
(2) the statutory authorization of punishment of a witness who
refuses to answer questions "pertinent to the question under in2
quiry.
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

The history of the judicial limitation that an investigation be for
a legislative purpose will be traced with a view toward determining
what constitutes legislative purpose, what evidence the courts have
considered to be relevant to show the presence or absence of legislative purpose, and what dangers are inherent in tests of legislative
purpose proposed by recent cases in lower federal courts. These
questions will not be discussed in the order stated, but as they are
raised by the cases in their chronological order.
Kilbourn v. Thompson
The first case of any real importance to the present discussion
is that of Kilbourn v. Thompson 3 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1880. It grew out of the financial crisis of 1873.
and was precipitated by the failure of Jay Cooke's banking firm
which was a depositary of federal funds. Early in 1876 the House
authorized a select committee to investigate financial dealings between Cooke and a "real estate pool" in the District of Columbia.
The resolution authorizing the investigation gave on its face no
hint of contemplated remedial legislation, rather, it showed. only
1. Fulbright, .CongressionalInvestigations: Significance for tha Legslative Process, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev 440 (1951)
2. Rev. Stat. § 102 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952)
3. 103 U.S. 168 (1880)
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_Qpgress' concern over the injury done to the governmexit's interests
as a creditor of Cooke's bank.4 The committee subpoenaed the manager of the pool, Hallett Kilbourn, who refused to answer questions
or produce documents. Kilbourn was then brought before the House
whdre he again refused to answer questions, asserting that the
House had.n 6 autioft), toinvestigate prvate business in which
nobody-.but me and my customers have any concern." 5 The House
cited Kilbourn for contempt and imprisoned him. The Supreme
Court subsequently declared- that Kilbourn's imprisonment had
been unlawful.
Avoiding the question of whether or not Congress ever has the
power-to compel testimony in aid of legislation, the Court decided
that here Congress. could not pumsh a contumacious witness because the particular investigation could remult i 1o valid legislation.
The .Court's concept .of what subjects can or cannot aid Congress
in legislating has been severely criticized for being much too
narrow. One writer has advanced the idea that Congress should
have the.power to investigate to find out if,
the.subject is one.on
which it can act, that is, Congress should have jurisdiction to determine if it has jurisdiction. 6 It will be seen later that one- federal
court m broadening the permissible scope of congressional inquiry
approximated the latter idea.7
McGram v. Daugherty
In the spring of 1924 the Senate launched its investigation of
alleged maladmmstration of the Department of Justice under
Attorney General Daugherty The Senate investigating committee
subpoenaed the Attorney General's brother, Mally S. Daugherty,
an Ohio banker, who disregarded the command.. Thereupon the
Senate itself adopted a resolution authorizing :the.assuance of a
warrant to compel Mally to -be brought before the. Senate. Mally
was alrrested by the Sergeant-at-Arms and applied to a federal
distiict court for a writ of !abeas corpus. The district court granted
the writ and discharged Daugherty from custody.$ The court
noted that in the first resolution authorizing tli committee to invegfigate, no mention was made of legislative purpose and in the
4. 4 Cong. Rec. 598- (1876).

5. Eberling, Congressional Investigations 213 (1928). See Eberling,
id. at 210-26, 329-33, 350-55 for a,complete history of-the case.
6. See Morgan, CongressionalInvestigations and Judicial Revea," Kilbourn v. Thompson Revsitedi 37 Calif. L. Rev. 556 (49).'-,
,7*See the opinoni !of the district court in UniteU.States v. Bryan, 72
F- Supp.'58(D.D.C...1947);-rei/d--ir curtam on othierlgrbmds, 174"F.Zd 525
(D.C, Cir. 1949), re-ldXbn-otlier grondi&, 339.U.S.'323(1,950).
8. Ex parte -Dughertj;299Fed..620 (S.D. Oluo'1924). ....
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second resolution the Senate referred to legislative action and
other action. The court said
The extreme personal cast of the original resolutions, the
spint of hosility towards the then Attorney General which
they breathe, that it was not avowed that legislative action
was had in view until after the action of the Senate had been
challenged, and that the avowal then was coupled with an
avowal that other action was had in view--are calculated to
create the impression that the idea of legislative action being
in contemplation was an afterthought. 9
The court argued that what was important in the case was not
the subject-matter but the nature of the investigation. It found that
the investigation was judicial in nature. The fact that some suggestion of needed legislation might come from the investigation,
that is, that the subject-matter could aid Congress in legislating,
would not validate the investigation. In arriving at its conclusion,
the court cited the Kilbourn case as standing for the proposition
that an investigation judicial in nature is invalid even though the
subject-matter of the investigation could aid Congress in legislating.10
The Supreme Court, in overruling" the district court, affirmed
12
the power of Congress to compel testimony in aid of legislation
and said
Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be
had and would be materially aided by the information which
the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected that the functions of the Department
of Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney General and
the duties of his assistants, are all subject to regulation by
congressional legislation, and that the department is maintained and its activities are carried on under such appropriations as in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to
year. The only legitimate object the Senate coidd have in
9. Id. at 638.
10. This was not the holding of the Court in the Kilbourn case. In that
case the Court held that the investigation could result in no valid legislation.
The Court did refer to the judicial nature of the investigation, but this reference is susceptible of at least two interpretations: (1) that an investigation
judicial in nature would be invalid even though the subject matter of the
investigation could aid Congress in legislating; and, (2) that the court took
a narrow view of the proper scope of a congressional investigation because
it felt that the investigation was judicial m nature.
11.

McGrain v. Daughert , 273 U.S. 135 (1927).

12. See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power

of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926) and Potts, Power of Legislatwe Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 691, 780 (1926) for
the history of the power of Congress to punish for contempt.
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orderbWg the investigatzon was to nut in legislahnzg, and we
think the subject-matter was such that the prestmption
shoudd be indulged that this was the real object. 3
The presumption raised by the Court seems to be well grounded
-at least when a court is reviewing an action of the whole House
or Senate as distinguished from an action of a House or Senate
committee. A judicial requirement that the Government prove a
valid legislative purpose could substantially limit the congressional
power of investigation. Depending on how much proof would be
required, the burden in some cases could be admimstratively impossible to sustain. As a result, broad and fearless inquiry so essential to enlightened legislation could be curtailed. An additional reason for the presumption is the respect due official congressional
action. It is highly inprobable that the whole House or Senate
would authorize an investigation for an illegitimate purpose.
At this point m the historical study the test of legislative purpose is quite objective. The Court is avowedly loolkng only at the
resolution authorizing the investigation. If the subject-matter of
the investigation, as stated by the resolution, may aid Congress in
legislating, then the presumption arises that the purpose of the
investigation is to get facts m order to aid Congress in legislating.
The resolution need not expressly refer to contemplated remedial
legislation.
A hint, however, that the resolution may not always be controlling and that a court may look elsewhere to find legislative
purpose can be gleaned from the fact that the Court in McGrati v.
Daugherty referred to a statement made by Senator George m the
debate on the resolution authorizing the investigation. The Senator
said that the purpose of the investigation was not to try Daugherty
but to get facts which would enable the Senate to discharge its
legislative duties properly."4
Sinclairv. Uited States'5
In 1924 the Senate had directed its standing Committee on
Public Lands to investigate the disposition of the naval oil reserves
at Teapot Dome by the Interior and Navy Departments. Various
contracts and leases had been made in connection with the disposition of the oil reserves. The oil magnate Harry F Sinclair was
called by the committee to testify concerning these contracts and
13. 273 U.S. at 177-78. (Emphasis added.)
14. 65 Cong. Rec. 3397-98 (1924).

15. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
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leases to which he was a party, but Sinclair refused to answer- the
questions of the committee on the grounds'that the whole matter
was of exclusively judicial concern (the matter was pending before
a grand jury), and also, that the questions asked were not pertinent
to the inquiry I"
Sinclair was tried and found guilty of contempt for his refusal
to answer the committee's questions. The Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction. Itfound that the subject-matter of the investigation
"might directly aid in respect of legislative action" and' that a
legislative purpose was avowed in the resolution authorizing the
investigation. At this point the Court apparently raised a presumption not only that the Senate had authorized the investigation for a
legislative purpose but also that the committee had coniducted the
investigation for a legislative purpose. The Court said that the
evidence introduced by the defendant was not enough to show
that "the committee intended to depart from the purpose to ascertain
whether additional legislation might be advisable." This seems to
indicate that the burden of proof is on the defendant to rebut the
presumption of a valid purpose not only of the Congress but also of
the investigating committee itself.
The Sinclair case differs from McGran in two respects. First,
the Court in Sinclair found an avowal of a legislative purpose in the
authorizing resolution before raising a presumption of a valid purpose. The Court in McGrain indicated that such an avowal was not
necessary This difference, however, appears to be immaterial because the body wording the resolution can simply state that the
purpose of the investigation is to ascertain what, if any, legislation
may be advisable. Such a general statement of purpose was sufficient
in Sinclair Secondly, in McGrain the Court was reviewing an
action of the whole Senate, in Sinclair it was reviewing an action
of a Senate committee. The distinction may be significant in applying the presumption of a valid purpose. The reasons advanced for
applying the presumption when a court reviews an action of the
whole House or Senate are not equally applicable in reviewing a
committee investigation. Administrative difficulties in proving legislative purpose may fetter a committee equally as much as the whole
House or Senate. It is debatable, however, whether or not cootmittee action is entitled to the same respect as an action of the
whole House or Senate. More will be made of the distinction later
in this Note.
16.

The question of pertinency is discussed

ifra at p. 634.
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Cases:m thw:Io-wer federal courts
Since the Sinclair case the Supreme Court has not had occasion
to deal squarely with the problem of legislative purpose. Subsequent
discussion of legislative purpose must be confined to cases in lower
federgl courts.
In 1946 the House Un-American Activities Committee subpoenaed the records of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
to discover whether or not funds raised by the organization avowedly for postwar foreign relief were in fact being spent for political
propaganda. Helen Bryan, secretary of the committee, was subpoenae to produce the records but refused to do so and was
cited for contempt.-- The district court in ruling on the sufficiency
of the indictment laid out what it considered to be the proper scope
of a legislative investigation
If the subject under scrutiny may have any possible relevancy
and materiality, no matter how remote, to some possible legislation, it is within the power of the Congress to investigate
the matter. Moreover, the relevancy and the materiality of
the subject matter reust be presuiwd.'
This is not the same presumption that the Court referred to in
McGrain v. Daugherty. In McGran the rule was that if the Court
finds that the subject is one which can aid Congress in legislating
then the presumption arises that the investigation is for a legislative
purpose. In United States v. Bryan the district court presumes that
the subject-matter of the investigation can aid Congress in legislation. *Adopting the reasomng of the Bryan case, every congressional investigation from its outset is presumed to be for a legislative
purpose. 9
Bryan is a sensible expansion of the Court's reasoning in
McGrain. The presumption raised by Bryan gives proper weight to
Congress' judgment as to what subjects can or cannot aid it in
dischargmg its legislative duties. This case, however, is weak
authority for the proposition that federal courts will presume that
the subject-matter of an investigation can aid Congress in legislating. Neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court m
United States v. Bryan considered this proposition advanced'by the
17. United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1947), rev'd per
curtain on other grounds, 174 F2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1949), re,'d on other

groum, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).

18. 72 F. Supp. at 61. (Emphasis added.)
19. This statement is subject to the qualification that first the Government must prove that the committee was investigating within the scope
of its authority. See note 23 infra.
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district court.20 No other case has been found in which a federal
court has adopted the presumption raised by the district court In
Bryan.
Arising out of the same investigation was the case of Morford
v. United States.2 The House Un-American Activities Committee
summoned Morford to produce the records of the National Council
for American-Soviet Friendship, Inc., and Morford refused to
comply On appeal from a contempt conviction in the district court,
Morford alleged error in the refusal of the lower court to admit
evidence that when the subpoena was issued against him the House
Committee on Un-American Activities had already passed judgment
on the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship and was
seeking to obtain names of persons participating in its activities for
the sole purpose of adding such names to the committee's blacklist.
The court of appeals said there was no error because a legitimate
legislative purpose is presumed when the general subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress can legislate. It said that
that presumption arises here, "and it cannot be rebutted by impugning the motives of individual members of the Committee."
Morford was not trying to impugn the motives of the committeemembers. He was trying to show that the committee was not pursuing a legislative purpose. The court by labeling as "motive" what
is in fact "purpose"22 indicates that it simply is not concerned with
the committee's concept of the purpose of the investigation.
Aside from semantics, the court's reasoning appears to be sound.
If a committee is investigating subjects which are within the scope
20. The court of appeals reversed the conviction relying solely on the
ground that the trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of law that it was
unnecessary to a conviction for contumacious failure to produce subpoenaed
records, that a quorum of the committee be present on the day the defendant
is required to produce the records. 174 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1949) The
Supreme Court in reversing the court of appeals considered only the quorum
issue and the question whether admission at trial of the defendant's remarks when she was called upon by the committee to produce the records
was in violation of the immunity section of the compulsory testimony statute.
The Court declined to decide other issues raised by the defendant which were
not passed on by the court of appeals. 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
21. 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 258 (1950) (error ii
selection of jury) Morford was subsequently tried again and convicted.
Morford v. United States, 184 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir.), cert. demed, 340 U.S.
878 (1950).
22. Concededly, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between "pur
pose" and "motive." Purpose is "that which one sets before him to accomplish, an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. " Black, Law Dictionary 1400 (4th ed. 1951). Motive "is the moving power which inpels to action
[It is] that which incites or stimulates a person to do
for a definite result.
" Black, Law Dictionary 1164 (4th ed. 1951)
an act.
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of its authority -a and if the subject-matter of the investigation may
aid Congress in legislating, a court should inquire no further into
the purpose of the committee-members. Congress' fact-finding power
is so important to enlightened legislation that "collateral"-" committee-member ends of blacklisting or exposure should not be
sufficient grounds to frustrate that power.
A somewhat dearer statement of the view that an invalid intent
of individual members of a committee is not a ground for mvalidating an otherwise legitimate investigation 'was given by the court
of appeals in United States v. Josephson.2
As a by-product of the
Eisler hearings, the House Un-American Activities Committee subpoenaed Leon Josephson, accused of helping Gerhart Eisler to
obtain a passport fraudulently. Josephson defied the committees
power and refused to be sworn, and was subsequently convicted of
contempt. Josephson contended that the committee's investigation
was made not for any legislative or remedial purpose, but only in
order to expose his political beliefs. The court answered by saying"
But we have no occasion now to decide whether a Congressional investigation may have exposure as its principal goal
or when, if ever, a statute may. It is sufficient to say that the
authorizing statute contains the declaration of Congress that
the information sought is for a legislative purpose and that
fact is thus established for us
regardless of any statement 2by
the
Committee
or
its
members
intimating the con6
trar-y

According to the majority of this court, the only important
criterion for determining purpose is the authorizing resolution.
If the resolution shows legislative purpose of the House or Senate
in authorizing the investigation the presumption of a valid purpose
becomes irrebuttable.
To complete the study of legislative purpose two recent cases
which deal with the requirement of legislative purpose should be
considered. In Watkins v. United States- the defendant was subpoenaed by a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities
23. The Government must always prove that the committee was investigating within the scope of the committee's authority. There is no presumption
of authority. See United States v. Kamim, 136 F Supp. 791 (D.Mass 1956),
United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 236 F2d 312
(2d Cir. 1956).
24. "Collateral" as used in this Note extends to the situation where the
sole purpose of the entire committee is something other than gathering facts
to aid m legislating.
25. 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
26. 165 F2d at 89.
27. 233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir.), cert. grantcd,352 U.S. 822 (1956).
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Committee. He came and answered questions relating to his past
membership in the Communist Party Watkins refused to 'ansN'er
questions -as to past membership of others who to his knowledge
had long since removed themselves from the Communist Party
Both the majority and dissenting judges in the court of appeals
reviewing Watkins' conviction for contempt thought that it Wag
important to judge the purpose of the subcommitte in asking the
questions rather than the purpose of the House in authorizing the
investigation. The judges held opposite opinions as to the sufficiency
of evidence of words and conduct of the House Un-American
Activities Committee on other occasions to show purpose of this
particular subcommittee. The majority found that there was a
valid legislative purpose and went on to say
Appellant would have us judge the present controversy upon
the basis of speeches made by members of Congress and
others, and upon newspaper articles, etc. We cannot do so.
Such material is not evidence. The question is an individual
one, whether the inquiry is indeed pertinent to a valid legislative purpose. It -cannot be solved by generalities culled from
speeches-many of them no doubt partially extemporaneous
-or from partisan assailants, critics, friends or defenders of
some project or cause. Moreover, even if the unbridled power
of exposure were claimed by some members of Congress,
the claim would not establish its use in any particular inquiry
We must judge
each inquiry in its own setting and upon
2
its own facts .
In his dissenting opinion Judge Edgerton came to the opposite conclusion. He said that "words and conduct of the Committee on other
occasions go far to confirm the inference that its purpose on this
'9
occasion was exposure.
The argument of the majority of the court seems the better
one. To hold otherwise would allow a court too much discretion
to pick off statements by committee-men made in communications
to the public or on the floor of Congress, selecting only those
which supported the court's preconceived idea as to the committee's
purpose in conducting the investigation.
The last important case for purposes of this section is Umtcd
States v. Icardi.30 The House had passed a resolution authorizing
28. 233 F.2d at 687
29. 233 F.2d at 692. "Conduct of the Committee on other occasions"
encompassed statements made by Congressmen who at the time of making the
statements were members of the Committee but were not members of the
Committee at the time of the investigation in question. It is at least questionable whether statements of past committee-members are relevant in determining the purpose of present committee-members.
30. 140 F Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956)
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the- Committee -on Armed "Services- or a subcommittee thereof to
investigate whether existing law adequately covered- crimes cominitted overseas by members of the Armed Forces, and whether the
Defense Department was being efficiently administered. Under
authority of that resolution, the chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services appointed a special subcommittee to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the disappearance and death of Major
William V Holohan while a member of the Armed Forces on
assignment to the OSS in the Italian -Campaign of 1944. The subcommittee wrote to Icardi, a former member of Holohan's OSS
team who was alleged to have been instrumental in causing
Holohan's death, requesting hun to testify. Icardi came and testified.
Subsequently, the subcommittee charged him with having given
perjured testimony. In the trial of Icardi for perjury, the chairman
of the subcommittee admitted that he had discussed with the other
member of the subcommittee and the subcommittee counsel, prior
to Icardi's appearance, the possibility of a perjury indictment as the
result of Icardi's testimony
The court found that "while the subject-matter confided to the
subcommittee for investigation was relevant to a
valid legislative purpose," the purpose of the subcommittee in requesting Icardi
to testify was to try him and was not to get information for any
valid legislative purpose. In arriving at this conclusion the court
considered the resolutions authorizing the inquiry, the transcript
of the subcommittee hearmgs, the subcommittee's letter requesting
Icardi to testify, the report of the subcommittee, and the testimony
at trial of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee
and the chairman of the special subcommittee. The court did
not say that there was no longer a presumption that the purpose
of the investigation was valid, it did say that the presumption of
innocence outweighs the presumption of a legislative purpose. Thus,
the Government must support the presumption of a valid purpose
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose of requesting
the testimony was a legislative purpose. However, it seems obvious
that if, in a criminal prosecution, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an investigation was for a valid legislative purpose, then any assertion of a presumption of valid purpose is
sheer verbiage. A possible rationalization of the court's holding, as
distinguished from its language, may be that the evidence, which
in the opinion of the court indicated that the subcommittee conducted the hearing to adjudicate crime, was sufficient to rebut the
presumption of a valid purpose of the subcommittee.
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Even if this rationalization is accepted the Icardi case differs
materially from Morford and Josephson. In Icardi the purpose
of the committee-men was controlling. In Morford and Josephson
the purpose of the committee-men was not considered to be relevant
to the question of the validity of the investigation. The merits of the
Icardi view were discussed in this Note in connection with the
Morford case.
Summary of "legtslative purpose"
Congress is pursuing a legislative purpose, as judicially defined,
when using the investigatory power (1) As a means of furnishing
itself with information necessary to the intelligent use of its constitutional power to enact laws.-" The permissible scope of inquiry
may be as broad as the lawmaking powers of Congress.ii Since
Kilbourn v.Thompson no case has held that the subject matter of
the investigation could not aid Congress in its lawmaking function.5
In Bryan the district court presumed that the subject matter could
aid Congress in legislating. Bryan, however, represents the opinion
of only one district court.34 (2) To supervise and check the operations of administrative agencies established by Congress. This type
of investigation is related to the lawmaking function in so far as laws
changing the administrative structure may be enacted as a result of
the investigation.
Whether or not Congress is pursuing a legislative purpose
when attempting to exercise an independent power of exposure
unrelated to legislation appears to be an open question.", The question, however, may be moot since it is difficult to conceive
of an investigation totally unrelated to legislation-except when
Congress is investigating in connection with the exercise of its power
of impeachment.
31. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
32. See, e.g., Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
33. An alternative holding in Icardi casts some doubt on this statement
The court in Icardi held that the false statements of Icardi "did not relate
to a material matter" inasmuch as the statements were incapable of influencing the committee on the issue before it. This holding might indicate
that the court thought that Icardi's testimony could not aid Congress in
legislating.
34. See note 20 supra. The Bryan case is discussed supra at p. 627
35. The United States Supreme Court has not squarely decided the
question. Decisions m the lower federal courts are not determinative. See,
e.g., Watkins v. United States, 233 F.2d 681, 687 (D.C. Cir.) ("Congress has
power of exposure if the exposure is incident to the exercise of a legislative
function") (emphasis added), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 822 (1956) , United
States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 89 n.8 (2d Cir. 1947) (raises but does not

decide the issue), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
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Evidence which the courts have considered in determining the
presence or absence of legislative purpose are: (1) The resolution
authorizing the investigation. Federal courts which look no further
than the language used in the resolution are apparently concerned only
with the purpose of the authorizing body. 6 (2) Minutes of the
particular hearing giving rise to the contempt or perjury charge.
Federal courts which recognize statements of committee-men made
during the hearing as bearing on purpose apparently are ascertaming the committee's purpose in conducting the investigation.3 - (3) Statements and actions of the committee-men prior
in time" to the investigation in question but relevant to ascertaining
the purpose of the particular investigation. The conversation m
the Icardi case between the members of the subcommittee and the
subcommittee counsel relating to a possible perjury indictment
against Icardi is illustrative. (4) The investigating committee's report, correspondence between the committee and the witness, and
testimony at trial of committee-members. 0 The one federal district
court whose scope of inquiry extended this far proceeded on the
premise that the presumption of legislative purpose yielded to the
presumption of innocence. Courts following this view presumably
will consider any relevant evidence.
Weighing heavily in the search for legislative purpose is the
presumption of a valid legislative purpose once it is shown that the
subject-matter of the investigation is germane to a legislative function. The presumption apparently attaches not only to the action of
the authorizing body, but also to the actions of the committee in
conducting the investigation. The challenge to this proposition by
the Icardi case relates only to the presumption as applied to the
actions of a committee in conducting an investigation.
Dangers inherent in the tests of legislative purpose as advanced
by the Watkins and Icardi cases are (1) That a court would have
too much discretion in judging legislative purpose. As an example,
the court could accept statements by past committee-men made orl
the floor of Congress or in communications to the public as relevant
to show the purpose of the present committee-men in conducting
an investigation.' 0 (2) That "collateral" purposes of the committee36. See, e.g., United States v. Josephson, 165 F2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. demed, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
37. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
38. Post-hearing statements made out of court by the committee-members are not entitled to consideration m ascertaining the purpose of the investigation. See United States v. Rumley, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).

39. United States v. Icardi, 140 F Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
40. See Watkins v. United States, 233 F.2d 681, 692 (1956) (where the

dissenting opinion relied on such information).
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members could invalidate an otherwise valid investigation. (3) That
requiring the Government to prove legislative purpose may be
casting too difficult a burden on the Government.
PERTINENCY

Every person who having been summoned as a witness
to
give testimony
upon any matter under inquiry before
any committee of either House of Congress
refuses to answer
any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
"I
In the discussion of "pertinency" three questions are presented (1)
what is the accepted test of pertinency of the question in a congressional investigation, (2) what are the objections to this test,
(3) is there a more acceptable test of pertinency These questions
will be discussed in that order.
In the Sinclair case, discussed above, the Court said that the
burden of proof was on the Government to show that the questions
asked of Sinclair were pertinent to the inquiry the committee was
authorized to make. Attempting to define pertinency the Court said
The matter for determination in this case was whether the facts
called for by the question were so related to the subjects covered
by the Senate's resolutions that such facts reasonably could be
said to be "pertinent to the question under inquiry -42
A further attempt to define pertinency under the statute was
made by the court of appeals in United States v. Orman.4" A subcommittee of the Senate's Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce asked witness Orman to produce
and allow to be entered into the record a book containing a record
of Orman's 1951 financial transactions. Orman refused to do so
unless he was assured by the subcommittee that the newspapers
would not publicize his affairs. Orman was cited for contempt and
convicted in the lower federal court. On appeal, Orman argued
that the lower court erred in keeping from the jury evidence of the
actual contents of the book. The contents of the book apparently
were not pertinent. The circuit court said that there was no error
because pertinency is not measured by the true answer but by the
possible answer to the question asked. At the time the subcommittee
asked Orman to produce the book the subcommittee had sufficient
41. Rev. Stat. § 102 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
42. 279 U.S. at 299.
43. 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
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reaspn to believe that the, book would show- Orman's connection
wath gambling. Tlis information would have been pertinent to the
authorized scope of the subcommittee's investigation.. If one possible
answer wouldbe pertinent then the question is pertinent.
-:BothSinclair and Ornanmeasure pertinency of the question by
the:relation between the possible answer and the authorized scope
of.-mqury The term pertinency .itself is not defined: the courts
apparently assume -the common law definition of the sister term,
relevancy. But whereas -m a trial the relevancy of particular evidence.may be judged by the issues as set forth in the pleadings and
during.other trial procedures, pertinency in a cpngressional investigation has no such limited yardstick. The courts have been forced
to jifdge pertinency in-relation to the broad grant of authority given
topthM.committee. Such a test gives a court little on which to judge
pertinency. As an example, the House Un-American Activities
Committee is authorized
(2)
.[T]o make from time to time investigations of (i) die
"xtent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United
States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks
the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our
C&isttion, and (iii) all other questions ti relation thereto
that:wotdd aid Congress in any iecessary relnediallegislation."
This grant of authority, necessarily broad, is no guide to a court in
jiidging pertinency of a possible answer to a question.
Pertinencyand due process
..Although lower federal courts appear to disagree, due process
would seem to require that a witness in a congressional investigation be informed of the subject-matter of the investigation with
some degree of particularity.4 5 When failure to answer sonte ques. 44. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 828. (Emphasis
added.)
45. This proposition has not prevailed in two federal courts of appeal.
See. United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947); cert. denied,
Z33 U.S. 838 (1948) (defendant was not forced to measure pertinency against
a standard he alleged was- too vague, since he refused to answer atny of the
questions asked him); Watkins v. United States-, 233 F2d 681 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted, 352 U.S. 822 (1956) (contempt statute and authorizing resolution. not-so vague as-to be invalid):
In United States v. Bryan, 72 F Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1947), re"Jd per
curam.on other grounds, -174 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1949), reVd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 323' (1950), the defendant argued before the district court
on motion to dismiss the indictment that the House Resolqtion under which
the Committee on Un-American Activities acted (see note 44 supfa and re-
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tions is a crime, a witness who may have substantial interest in not
answering should be able to ascertain with reasonable certainty
which questions he must answer. The argument against this proposition is that neither Congress in authorizing the investigation nor
the committee in conducting the investigation will know beforehand precisely what course the investigation will take. 40 By holding
a committee within too narrowly defined a subject-matter a court
may be throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Granting the
validity of the argument, a court could still require that the committee state the subject-matter of the investigation with more particularity than that given by the broad resolution granting investigatory powers to the committee. The resolution authorizing a standing
committee must of necessity be broad. However, the committee
conducting an investigation should be able to state more specifically
the subject-matter of the particular investigation without seriously
limiting itself. Just how much particularity should be required is a
difficult question. It can only be solved by weighing the interests
of the witness in a highly particularized statement of the subjectmatter as against the interests of the committee in a loosely drawn
statement.
The House of Representatives does have a rule which provides
that "the chairman at an investigative hearing shall announce in an
opening statement the subject of the investigation."' 7 This rule if
judicially imposed on both the House and Senate as a requirement
of due process would give both the witness and the courts a standard
against which to judge pertinency The chairman's statement would
lated text) failed to prescribe an ascertainable standard of guilt and was
thus violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Despite the
fact that the criminal contempt statute was meaningless as to the pertinency
question without the resolution, the court stated that since the resolution was
not a penal statute the "void for vagueness" doctrine did not apply. To the
specific contention that a subpoenaed individual could not tell whether the
committee was exceeding its jurisdiction, the court replied that such a person
"acts at his peril. The provisions of an investigating Resolution are not
drawn primarily for the benefit of a witness, but are framed for the
guidance of the Committee. There are many situations in which a person
assumes a risk in determining whether what he intends to do constitutes a
crime." 72 F Supp. at 64. But cf. M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States,
327 U.S. 614 (1946) (the rule applicable to penal statutes also applies to OPA
regulations backed up by criminal sanctions) which the court summarily
but perhaps properly distinguished away. Neither the court of appeals nor
the Supreme Court considered this argument in the Bryan case. See note 20
supra.
46. See the district court opinion in United States v. Bryan, supra note
45, 72 F Supp. at 63.
47 H.R. Res. 151, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 Cong. Rec. 3020 (daily ed.
March 23, 1955) It is too early to tell whether or not the House committees
are following the rule.
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be- the yardstick against which to judge pertinency of the questions

asked by the committee"
A more satisfactory solution was offered by Senator Hennmings
while testifying before the Subcommittee on Rules of the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration in June of 1954. He recommended that a majority of a committee be required to pass a motion
or resolution scheduling hearings or ordering a particular investigation. The motion or resolution was to state with particularity the
subject-matter of the investigation. In support of his recommendation he said.
I think it well to point out the advisability of requiring a motion
or resolution scheduling hearings or ordering investigations to
be stated dearly and with particularity. It will, first, provide
a witness with the indication of what the line of interrogation
will be once he appears before the committee. Second, it will
define the scope of the investigation or hearing and will be of
invaluable assistance to the committee itself and to the witness,
and perhaps even to the courts, in determining the materiality
or the pertinency of certain questions. 49
It is extremely unlikely, however, that any federal court would impose such a formalized procedure on the committees as a requirement of due process.
CONCLUSIONS

The courts have made little use of the judicial limitation that
a congressional investigation be for a legislative purpose. Possibly
the courts have recognized that the limitation is unworkable. First,
a court is not being realistic if it says that a particular investigation
is not for a legislative purpose in that the subject-matter of the
investigation cannot aid Congress in legislating. It is almost inconceivable that the subject-matter of any authorized congressional
investigation could not aid Congress in legislating. Secondly, it is
doubtful whether invalid purposes of committee-members in conductmg an investigation should negate a valid legislative purpose
of the House or Senate in authorizing the investigation. At best,
then, the limitation is a weak crutch of possible support to a judge in
striking down a contempt or perjury charge arising out of an in48. In debates on H.R. Res. 151, one Representative said that the chairman's statement would not bind the committee. See 101 Cong. Rec. 3021
(daily ed. March 23, 1955). Due process, however, does not turn on legislative
intent.

49. Rides of Procedure for Senate Investigating Committees, Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Rules of the Committee on Riles and Admnstration, United States Senate, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 31 (1954).
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vestigation which the judge feels was just too much of a witchhunt
or trial.
A more satisfactory solution to the problem of weighing the
interests of the witness as against Congress' need for adequate investigatory powers seems to lie in the proper application of the
statute authorizing punishment of a witness who refuses to answer
questions pertinent to the question under inquiry The standard for
judging pertinency used by the courts in most cases has been the
broad resolution of the House or Senate initially granting investigatory powers to the committee. This standard is vague. It was suggested in this Note that a court should require the committee chairman to state the subject-matter of the investigation at the outset
of the hearing. The statement if binding on the committee could
answer due process objections to the present vague standard and
also give the courts a yardstick against which to judge pertinency
of the questions asked during the hearing.
The standard suggested is not a panacea. However, it may be a
partial solution to the problem of abuses of congressional investigations. If the chairman's statement is binding on the committee, the
committee may wish to participate in phrasing the statement before
the hearing. This may foster responsible committee consideration of
why a particular witness is being called.

